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Abstract A well-functioning monetary transmission mechanism is critical for
monetary policy. As the Dominican Republic recently adopted an inflation targeting
regime, it is even more relevant to guarantee that changes in the monetary policy
rates are quickly and fully reflected in retail rates, to eventually influence aggregate
demand and inflation. This paper estimates the interest rate pass-through of the
monetary policy rate to retail rates and explores asymmetries in the adjustment. We
find evidence of complete pass-through to retail rates, confirming the effectiveness
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. However, our results also suggest a
faster pass-through to lending rates than to deposit rates and asymmetric adjust-
ments of short-term rates, as deposit rates respond faster to policy rate cuts and
lending rates respond faster to policy rate hikes. Measures to enhance competition in
the financial system could help to achieve a symmetric adjustment of retail rates.
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1 Introduction
The global slowdown and recent price developments renewed the interest in
evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy. It is widely acknowledged that an
effective monetary policy relies on a well-functioning transmission mechanism. If
changes in monetary policy rates are quickly and fully transmitted to retail rates, the
latter have a faster impact on domestic demand and therefore inflation (Mishkin
1995; Becker et al. 2012). Conversely, if retail rates are sticky, the monetary policy
goals take longer and are harder to achieve. As the Dominican Republic recently
adopted an inflation targeting regime, it is even more relevant to ensure that changes
in the monetary policy rates are quickly and fully reflected in retail rates to
eventually affect inflation.
The theoretical literature advanced several possible explanations as to why the
interest rate pass-through may be slow, incomplete, more than complete, or
asymmetric. These include asymmetric information, menu costs, switching costs,
risk sharing, ownership of the financial system, economic conditions, and bank
concentration. While the empirical literature for advanced and emerging economies
is vast, the evidence for the Dominican Republic remains limited.
In this paper, we estimate the interest rate pass-through for retail rates in the
Dominican Republic. The contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we
provide a wide spectrum of results for retail rates at different maturities and for a
recent period, with some analysis of the fiscal costs (i.e., public sector borrowing
costs) associated with monetary policy. Second, we test for asymmetries in the
adjustment to equilibrium and simulate the symmetric and asymmetric adjustment
of retail rates to changes in the monetary policy rate.
We find evidence of complete pass-through to retail rates, confirming the
effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Similarly, our results
indicate that government domestic bond yields increase when monetary policy
becomes more contractionary. However, we also find evidence of a faster pass-
through to lending rates than to deposit rates. Moreover, short-term deposit rates
respond faster to policy rate cuts with respect to hikes, while short-term lending
rates respond faster to policy rate hikes with respect to cuts. The theoretical
literature associates asymmetries in the speed of adjustment to collusive market
behaviors. Thus, measures to boost competition in the financial system could help to
achieve a symmetric adjustment of retail rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the theoretical contributions
explaining rigidities and asymmetries in the interest rate pass-through, comments on
the institutional features of the financial system of the Dominican Republic, and
discusses the empirical evidence for the country. Section III presents the empirical
strategy. Section IV discusses the results. Section V concludes.
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2 The pass-through in the Dominican Republic
In this section, we briefly review the main theoretical reasons for which retail rates
may show stickiness or asymmetries when the monetary policy changes. Then, we
describe the institutional framework of the Dominican banking system and review
the existing empirical literature on the interest rate pass-through for the Dominican
Republic.
2.1 Theoretical contributions
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) relate stickiness to asymmetric information. When banks
perceive the default risk to be high, they are inclined to maintain a large spread
between lending and deposit rates. However, given that borrowers that accept higher
rates are likely to be of poor quality and borrowers with less risky investments are
likely not to borrow if rates increase (i.e., adverse selection), and given that any
increase of lending rates will give incentives for borrowers to choose riskier projects
(i.e., moral hazard), any monetary policy rate increase would raise the probability of
loan default. Thus, banks may decide not to raise their rates albeit their cost for
getting funds increases, and reach the equilibrium in the loan market by rationing
credit. As a result, lending rates may be rigid upwards and adjustment may turn out
to be asymmetric.
Bernanke et al. (1996) show that financial frictions may cause large fluctuations
in economic activity, and consequently in retail rates. In the presence of asymmetric
information, lenders may require borrowers to collateralize their assets. In response
to a monetary policy rate hike, for example, the balance sheets of firms deteriorate
owing to the fall in asset prices. As a result, firms have less ability to borrow, which
ultimately affects investment. This starts a vicious cycle (i.e., financial accelerator)
where lower economic activity dampens asset prices, which further tightens
financing conditions and reduces economic activity. This mechanism may induce
overpass-through from the monetary policy rate to the retail rates.1
De Bondt (2005) uncovers another reason for which asymmetric information
leads to overpass-through. Banks may react to risks involved in asymmetric
information by raising interest rates beyond the size of the increase in the policy
dictated rate, instead of rationing credit. In other words, lending rates must increase
by an amount greater than the increase in the monetary policy rate to compensate for
the decrease in the probability of repayment. However, there is a limit to this.
Beyond some interest rate level, banks will not be able to increase the interest rate
sufficiently to compensate for this risk and all lending will be made to the less risky
borrowers. However, until this happens, the bank rate on these loans should be very
sensitive to changes in the market interest rate.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) explain price rigidity by formulating the menu
costs theory. This predicts that firms will change their prices only when the benefits
from doing this are greater than the costs of changing prices (e.g., printing,
advertising new price lists, communicating to customers, etc.). Hence, if the
1 See also Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gerali et al. (2010).
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monetary policy rate change is perceived as small and temporary, and the costs
associated to changing retail rates are higher than the benefits, banks may opt to
delay the retail rate changes.2
Lowe and Rohling (1992) argue that switching costs can cause retail rates
rigidity. Banks incur costs to collect information about the risk profile and behaviors
of their customers and these are generally passed on to them as one-off fees. If costs
associated to switching to a different bank are high enough, customers may decide
to accept a more penalizing interest rate by their current bank instead of incurring
these costs. Thus, higher switching costs may imply stickiness of retail rates as well
as asymmetric adjustment.
Fried and Howitt (1980) show that banks and customers are better off by sharing
risk and this increases retail rates rigidity. More specifically, as movements in
interest rates affect banks’ and customers’ earnings, banks could offer an
equilibrium risk-sharing agreement (e.g., an insurance contract) for which banks
agree to compensate customers in case of unfavorable interest rate movements
against the payment of a fee. Customers would then hesitate to change banks
because of this agreement. Similarly, Berger and Udell (1992) highlight the role
played by implicit contracts for which banks interested in long-term relationships
are willing to offer more stable interest rates. All these kinds of agreements result in
stickier retail rates.
The ownership structure of the financial system also plays a role in shaping the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. State-owned financial institutions are
often the key in achieving policy objectives of governments, and as a result
maximizing profit is not their primary aim. In this context, interest rates are likely to
adjust with a delay due to inefficiencies and political considerations, hence causing
stickiness in interest rate adjustment.
E´gert et al. (2007) and E´gert and Macdonald (2009)highlight the role of
macroeconomic conditions in affecting retail rates stickiness. If volatility is high,
the information content of policy signals is reduced as noise increases. Conse-
quently, banks would wait more to change their rates. Moreover, the pass-through is
likely to be faster during high inflation periods as prices are adjusted more
frequently. High economic growth also favors a quicker pass-through as banks find
it easier to pass on changes when conditions are favorable.
The interest rate pass-through may be asymmetric because bank concentration
leads to oligopolistic behaviors. On one hand, the collusive behavior hypothesis of
Hannan and Berger (1991) suggests that following an increase in the monetary
policy rate, deposit rates could be rigid upwards because higher deposit rates
represent an additional cost for banks. Similarly, the lending rates could exhibit
downward rigidity in reaction to a reduction in the monetary policy rate as lower
lending rates imply lower profits for banks. On the other hand, the adverse customer
reaction hypothesis indicates that if customers have bargaining power deposit rates
2 De Bondt (2002) and De Bondt et al. (2003) further analyze the role of expectations of future interest
rates, explaining that the current change in retail rates also depends on the extent to which the monetary
policy rate change has been anticipated and how it changes future rates.
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could be rigid downwards when the monetary policy rate falls and lending rates may
be rigid upwards when the monetary policy rate increases.
2.2 Characteristics of the Dominican financial system and empirical
evidence
The recent history of the Dominican Republic’s monetary policy starts with the
Monetary and Financial Law of 2002. The law strengthened the institutional
framework for the conduct of monetary policy by establishing price stability as the
main central bank’s mandate. Starting in 2004, the central bank moved away from
exchange rate targeting and transitioned to monetary targeting. In this context, it
introduced an overnight deposit window and a Lombard facility, which created a
corridor for the interbank rate. The overnight rate served as signal of the monetary
policy stance.
The monetary targeting anticipated the transition to the inflation targeting
regime. While the central bank managed to significantly reduce inflation and
stabilize the economy under the monetary targeting, financial innovation and
deregulation as well as financial sector reforms generated a growing instability in
money demand, weakening the relationship between money and inflation (Andu´jar
2014). To strengthen monetary policy effectiveness, the BCRD adopted an inflation
targeting regime in January 2012. Starting in February 2013, the authorities
introduced the monetary policy rate as the benchmark rate, which is in the middle of
a corridor bounded by the one-day deposit and expansion facilities.
Since the financial crisis of 2003–04, the financial system developed consider-
ably but remains highly concentrated. As of June 2015, the system is composed of
65 financial entities with assets over 45% of GDP and a loan portfolio of 27% of
GDP.3,4 Most of the loans go to the commercial sector (58.7%), while the remainder
is split between personal consumption loans (24%) and mortgage loans (17.3%).
Commercial and mortgage loans are usually backed by a collateral, which
contributes to lower the interest rate. In June 2006, the three main banks used to
represent 57.5% of deposits and 58.2% of loans, while as of June 2015 they
represent 67.7% of deposits and 69.0% of loans.
As discussed, the degree of concentration is often associated with collusive
behavior. This generally translates into high profits for banks as well as asymmetries
in the adjustment of retail rates to the monetary policy rates. In the Dominican
Republic, spreads are high at all maturities (6.5% on average for 3-month spread
over 2006–2015) and vary significantly when the monetary policy rate changes.5
This suggests that deposit and lending rates may either react differently to changes
in the monetary policy rate, react asymmetrically to lifts and cuts in the monetary
policy rate, or both.
3 Ratios to GDP are calculated using the 2014 nominal GDP.
4 The financial system consists of 17 commercial banks (85.8% of the system assets), 10 saving and
credit institutions (11.1% of the system assets), 19 credit unions (1.9% of the system assets), several credit
corporations (0.3% of the system assets), and a development bank (0.9% of the system assets).
5 While this is true for spreads at all maturities, we present only the 3-month spread in the chart for space
reasons.
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Table 1 summarizes the findings of the empirical literature on interest rate pass-
through for the Dominican Republic. Sample size, interest rate variables, model
specifications, and estimation methodologies vary significantly across studies. Most
of the literature finds evidence of overpass-through to lending rates, albeit the
results present a significant variation in the estimated pass-through. As for the
deposit rates, results are generally mixed, with estimates ranging from incomplete to
overpass-trough.
Gonza´lez Pantaleo´n (2010) finds over pass-through of the interbank rate to both
lending and deposit rates. He employs an error correction model (ECM) to estimate
a specification that includes several explanatory variables. He finds that the
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread, the reserve requirement coefficient,
and the Lombard window rate are significantly associated to increases in retail rates.
Rivas (2011) is the first to explore asymmetries in the interest rate pass-through
for the Dominican Republic. With an asymmetric ECM applied to a parsimonious
specification that includes only the interbank rate, he studies the adjustment of the
retail rates to positive or negative changes in the monetary policy rate. He finds
Table 1 Literature for the Dominican Republic
Author Empirical
approach




































































BCRD (2015) N/A N/A Loans: 1.06–1.63,
Deposits: 0.85–0.92
The estimated long-run coefficient refers to different maturities depending on the paper
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overpass-through for the 6-month and 1-year lending rates and completes pass-
through for the same maturity deposit rates. He also finds evidence of increased
efficiency of monetary transmission mechanism in the post-crisis period compared
to the pre-crisis one. Finally, he does not find any evidence of asymmetric
adjustment.
Medina Cas et al. (2011) find a high degree of stickiness in the pass-through to
deposit and lending rates. Using a 40-country panel data over the period 2004–2010,
the authors estimate a dynamic specification with system generalized method of
moments (S-GMM) that includes interaction terms between the monetary policy
rate and a set of explanatory variables. The authors find that although the estimated
pass-through for the Dominican Republic is incomplete owing to high dollarization
and limited exchange rate flexibility, it is greater than for Central American
countries.
By employing an ECM, Andu´jar (2012) finds a complete pass-through to lending
rates and an incomplete one to deposit rates. Also, his results suggest that starting in
2005 themonetary transmissionmechanismbecamemore efficient and that changes in
the interbank rate take from four to 5 months to be reflected in retail rates. Finally,
using simulations the author shows that permanent changes in the policy rates are
associated with a stronger reaction of retail rates compared to temporary changes.
Aristy Escuder (2014) finds evidence of overpass-through for both lending and
deposit rates. More specifically, he estimates an autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model with a parsimonious specification including only the overnight rate.
His results suggest that the size of the overpass-through is much larger than in the
existing literature.
Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana (2015) also finds overpass-through to
the lending rates, but incomplete or complete pass-through to the deposit rates.
While estimation details are not available, the study presents results for a wide range
of interest rates and for the calculations of the speed of adjustment in months. This
ranges between one and 2 months for all interest rates, with the exception of the
6-month lending rate, which adjusts in about 4 months.
3 Empirical strategy
Let rrt denote the endogenously determined retail rate at time t:
rrt ¼ aþ b1mprt þ b2Xt þ ut; ð1Þ
where a is an intercept which denotes a mark-up or mark-down on the retail rate to
reflect market conditions,6 mprt is the monetary policy rate,
7 Xt includes a set of
factors influencing the retail rate beyond the monetary policy rate, b1 and b2 are the
6 See Marotta (2009).
7 The monetary policy rate used in the regressions is a proxy of the average monetary policy rate for the
month. Given that the decision to change or maintain the rate is taken during the last week of the month,
we assume that the average for the current month is equal to the last month’s value of the monetary policy
rate.
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relative coefficients, and ut is a stochastic error term that captures unobserved
heterogeneity.8
Departing frommost papers in the literature, we employ a richer specification with
the vector of exogenous covariates Xt encompassing five variables. First, we add the
reserve requirement coefficient for commercial bank deposits at the central bank in
local currency as increases in the coefficient correspond to withdrawals of liquidity in
the financial system, resulting in higher retail rates. Second, we also add non-
performing loans (NPLs) as a share of total loans with the aim of capturing increases
(decreases) in the lending (deposit) rates that compensate higher banks’ losses when
NPLs increase. Third, we include the average exchange in the event retail rates adjust
to maintain a stable pace of depreciation rather as a reaction to changes in the
monetary policy rate. Fourth, we include the EMBI spread as a time-varying measure
of the risk premium. And fifth, we add the Volatility Index (VIX) to reflect external
market’s volatility (especially advanced economies) expectation for the next
30 days. The expected effect of the VIX is ambiguous. When volatility in advanced
economies is high, interest rates may drop as capital flies toward emerging markets
such as the Dominican Republic, or may go up if volatility is perceived as a global
issue and capital flies to quality. Finally, we add two dummy variables for regime
changes. The first one is for the inflation targeting period and the second is for the
period in which the monetary policy rate was introduced as a benchmark.
Our attention falls on the fraction of the change in monetary policy rate reflected
in changes in retail rates over the long run.9 This is expressed by the parameter b2,
which is close to zero when the transmission mechanism is weak and takes value
one when the pass-through is complete. As discussed, a bunch of factors may
prevent the pass-through to be complete, and in some cases, b1 could be higher than
one, implying overpass-through.
With the purpose of having a wide glance at the financial system, we analyze the
impact of changes inmonetary policy on several retail rates withmonthly data over the
period June 2006–June 2015. In particular, rrt is, alternatively, the deposit or lending
rate at 90, 180, 360 days, the weighted average rate, as well as the commercial,
personal consumption, and mortgage lending rate of commercial banks.10 Also, we
explore the interest rate pass-through from the monetary policy rate to government
domestic bond rates for instruments at 5, 7, and 10 years, as well as for 10-year
government bonds issued in the sovereign market. However, since these kinds of
instruments are not issued every month, we rely on the interest rate in the secondary
market. Given the reduced sample size, results need to be taken with caution.11
8 A trend is excluded a priori because there is no theoretical reason for which interest rates should exhibit
a deterministic time trend (see Hamilton 1994).
9 As we are interested in estimating the pass-through from themonetary policy rate—which is clearly
exogenous—to retail rates, and to avoid relying on asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood
estimation, we opt for a single equation approach rather than a multivariate one.
10 Due to data availability, we limit our analysis to commercial banks, which represent 85.8 percent of
the financial system assets.
11 Observations start in May 2009 for the 5-year domestic bonds, February 2010 for the 7-year domestic
bonds, August 2010 for the 10-year domestic bonds, and April 2010 for the 10-year sovereign bonds, and
end in June 2015. However, the series contain some missing observations.
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The literature often finds that interest rate series are non-stationary. In the
presence of unit roots, estimating Eq. (1) with ordinary least squares would result in
spurious coefficients. Thus, we first test the levels and first differences of all series
for unit root employing the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. When the
hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected for the levels, we test for cointegration
between the retail rates and the monetary policy rate using the Engle-Granger test.
In those groups of data for which cointegration are not found, we estimate the
following ADL model:
Drrt ¼ gþ c1Dmprt þ
Xn
i¼1








where D is the difference operator, g is the constant, c1 is the short-run pass-through
(i.e., within the same month), dk are the coefficients for the changes in the variables
of vector Xt and their lags, fj are the coefficients for the changes of the lags of the
dependent variable, n, m, and p are the maximum number of lags, and et is a white






For groups of data sharing a long-run relationship (i.e., cointegrated), Eq. (2) can
be re-parameterized into an error correction model (ECM) that ties the short-run
disequilibrium to the long-run equilibrium (Hendry and Nielsen 2007):
Drrt ¼ gþ c1Dmprt þ
Xn
i¼1
ciDmprti þ d1DXt þ
Xm
k¼1
dkDXtk þ qut1 þ et; ð3Þ
where q is the percentage of the previous period deviation from to the long-run
equilibrium ut - 1 that is corrected in every period t. In other words, it represents the
speed at which bank rates adjust back to equilibrium after a change in the monetary
policy rate.12
Enders and Siklos (2001) show that the Engle–Granger cointegration test is
misspecified if adjustment is asymmetric. In particular, they argue that it is a special
case of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, which allows testing for
asymmetric cointegration. The TAR model can be written as:
Dut ¼ Itq1ut1 þ ð1 ItÞq2ut1 þ
Xq
l¼1
clDutl þ vt; ð4Þ
where It is the Heaviside indicator function such that:
12 The literature (see Doornik and Hendry 1994) also calculates the mean adjustment lag as 1 c1ð Þ=q;
which reveals how many months it takes for the change in the monetary policy rate to be fully reflected in
retail rates. This measure, however, assumes that there is complete pass-through (i.e.,b1 ¼ 1; and that the
portion of adjustment q is the same every month (rather than being a percentage of previous year
deviation from equilibrium).
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It ¼ 1; ut1 s0; ut1\s

; ð5Þ
and q1 and q2 are the estimates if ut-1 is above or below the threshold s, respectively.
The value of s is unknown and can be estimated using the method illustrated in
Chan (1993). However, it can also be set a priori. In our case, we set it to zero and
we also estimate it. Enders and Siklos (2001) propose the U and the t-max statistics
to test for asymmetric cointegration. The U statistic is an F-statistic testing the null
hypothesis that q1 = q1 = 0, while the t-max is a t-statistic testing the null
hypothesis with the largest qi = 0.
13 Hence, if the null hypothesis of no cointe-
gration is rejected, we can test the null hypothesis that q1 = q2 by a standard F-
statistic. A rejection of this hypothesis implies asymmetric adjustment.
Policymakers may be interested in reducing large changes in the retail rates.
Enders and Granger (1998) and Carner and Hansen (1998) propose a variation of the
TAR model of Eq. (4), known as momentum TAR (M-TAR) model:
Dut ¼ Mtq1ut1 þ ð1MtÞq2ut1 þ
Xq
l¼1
clDuti þ vt; ð6Þ
where Mt is an alternative Heaviside indicator function to the one in Eq. (5) such
that:
Mt ¼ 1; Dut1 s0; Dut1\s

: ð7Þ
As in the case of the TAR model, we test for asymmetric cointegration both when
s is set to zero and when it is endogenously determined within the M-TAR
framework. The interpretation of the TAR and M-TAR models, however, differs.
The TAR model tests if the deviation from the long-run equilibrium is persistent
assuming equal magnitudes of positive and negative shocks, whereby the M-TAR
model tests if the deviation from the long-run equilibrium is persistent irrespective
of the magnitude of the disequilibrium.
If asymmetric cointegration is present, the ECM in Eq. (3) can be rewritten as the
following TAR model:
Drrt ¼ gþ c1Dmprt þ
Xn
i¼1




þ ð1 ItÞq2;rrut1 þ et;
ð8Þ
or the following M-TAR model:
13 Note that the necessary conditions for convergence are for the parameters qi to be negative.
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Drrt ¼ gþ c1Dmprt þ
Xn
i¼1
ciDmprti þ d1DXt þ
Xm
k¼1
dkDXtk þMtq1;rrut1 þ ð1
MtÞq2;rrut1 þ et;
ð9Þ
where q1,rr and q2,rr are the asymmetric speed of adjustment parameters.
4 Results
We first present the baseline results for the interest rate pass-through. Then, we
present the results accounting for the existence of asymmetries. Finally, we simulate
the impact of a change in the monetary policy rate on retail rates.
4.1 Baseline
We test for unit root and cointegration.14 The results of the ADF test on the levels
suggest that the null hypothesis of unit root presence cannot be rejected at five
percent significance level for all series, with the exception of the weighted average
deposit rate. However, as the evidence of stationarity is not compelling, we proceed
to test stationarity for first differences. After first-differencing, the null hypothesis of
unit root presence is safely rejected for all series. The Engle–Granger test’s null
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for all series combinations except the
government bond rates, suggesting that the monetary policy rate shares a long-run
relationship only with the retail rates.
The results for the estimation of the error correction model for retail rates are
reported in Table 2. The estimation of Eq. (1) reveals that the pass-through to
deposit rates is complete, as the long-run coefficient ranges between 1.0 and 1.1.
Similarly, the pass-through to lending rates is complete, with the long-run
coefficient ranging from 1.0 to 1.2. To confirm the statistical validity of the finding
of complete pass-through, we employ a Wald test with the null hypothesis of the
long-run pass-through coefficient being different from one. In all cases, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis.
Other explanatory variables turn out significant. An increase in the EMBI spread
is unequivocally reflected in higher deposit and lending rates. The effect is robust
across maturities and lending categories. An increase in the reserve requirement
coefficient is found to have a positive effect on most of the lending rates, consistent
with a reduction of liquidity. Changes in the NPL ratio are not significantly
associated with retail rates. The exchange rate turns out significant only for the
specification of lending rates and personal consumption, suggesting that these
increase in response to depreciation. Finally, we find some evidence of lower
lending rates owing to heightened advanced economies’ volatility risk, proxied by
the VIX. However, the effect is relatively small and not robust across maturities.
14 See Appendix I for the test results.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 4 Page 14 of 25 Lat Am Econ Rev  (2017) 26:4 
123
The estimation of Eq. (3) provides information about the short-run effect on
retail rates. The short-run effect of one percentage point increase in the change of
the monetary policy rate on the change of deposit rates ranges between 0.5 and 0.7
percentage points. In other words, 50 to 70% of the pass-through is transmitted to
deposit rates within the same month. The short-run impact on the change in lending
rates ranges between 0.6 and 0.8 percentage points, with the exception of the short-
run impact for the 6-month lending rate, which is 1.2 percentage points. The latter is
abnormally high compared to other maturities and the reason may lie with the
idiosyncratic movements in the 6-month lending rate, therefore results should be
taken with caution.15 The only maturity for which the short-run impact on the
lending rate is lower than the one on the deposit rate is the 3-month one, implying a
decrease in the spread in the short-run.
The speed of adjustment is higher for lending rates. In general, deviations from
the long-run equilibrium are more quickly corrected in the case of lending rates as
the relative speed of adjustment ranges between -0.3 and -0.8, compared to a
coefficient range between -0.2 and -0.4 for deposit rates.
Other explanatory variables present results generally consistent with the long-
term equation estimations. Changes in the EMBI spread are associated with
increases in deposit rates and some of the lending rates. Changes in the reserve
requirement also increase deposit and lending rates, however, these effects are not
robust across maturities and are not significant for lending categories. Somewhat
different from the results of the long-term estimations, a positive change in the NPL
ratio is associated with a fall in deposit rates and with increases in lending rates.
While this finding is not robust for all rates, it possibly underscores the banks’ need
to compensate for the fall in profitability that occurs when more loans become non-
performing and losses are provisioned. Finally, changes in the VIX index turn out to
be significant only in raising the change in the personal consumption rate and by a
minor amount.
Table 3 presents the results of the ADL estimation in Eq. (2) for the government
bond rates.16 As expected, changes in the monetary policy rate only affect changes
in the rates of domestically issued bonds. More specifically, a change in the
monetary policy rate by one percentage point is associated with a short-run impact
on the change of domestically issued bond rates by 0.5–0.6 percentage points,
depending on the maturity of the instrument. Using the coefficient of the lagged
differenced dependent variable, we can retrieve the long-run coefficient which
ranges between 0.8 and 0.9 percentage points. Thus, the pass-through in this case
seems less than complete.
15 Alternative estimations using dummy variables for September and October of 2009 present a short-run
coefficient of 0.8. However, we opt to drop dummies in the baseline specifications as we have no clear
reasons for including them.
16 Given the short sample and the little variation in the monetary policy rate over it, we also estimate the
ADL model replacing the monetary policy rate with the interbank rate. The results are similar and
available from the authors upon request.
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4.2 Asymmetries
Weemploy the TARandM-TAR tests to explore asymmetric cointegration between the
monetary policy rate and all retail rates.17 As a first step, we set the threshold to zero. In
the case of the TAR test, the null hypothesis of symmetric cointegration cannot be
rejected.The results are similar in the caseof theM-TARtest, aswe cannotfindevidence
of asymmetric cointegration. As a second step, we let the TAR andM-TAR threshold to
be endogenously determined. When employing the TAR test, we find evidence of
asymmetric cointegration for the weighted average deposit rate, 3-month, 6-month, and
1-year lending rates, and themortgage lending rate. TheM-TAR test finds even stronger
evidence of asymmetric cointegration, as it rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric
cointegration for all series, except the 6-month lending rate.
Table 3 ADL model estimation for government bonds
Domestic External
Five years 7 years 10 years 10 years
Diff. monetary policy rate 0.567*** 0.48*** 0.447*** -0.009
(0.168) (0.109) (0.138) (0.073)
Lag diff. monetary policy rate 0.554*** 0.759*** 0.463** -0.104*
(0.184) (0.181) (0.195) (0.06)
Lag diff. dependent variable -0.493*** -0.325** -0.210 -0.104*
(0.136) (0.137) (0.158) (0.06)
Diff. reserve requirement coefficient 0.040 0.073 -0.125** -0.010
(0.719) (0.047) (0.057) (0.023)
Diff. EMBI 0.945** 0.680 0.473 1.018***
(0.44) (0.459) (0.347) (0.08)
Diff. VIX -0.074* -0.019 -0.043** -0.026***
(0.04) (0.034) (0.02) (0.007)
Dummy inflation targeting -0.356 0.064 -0.086 0.035
(0.289) (0.273) (0.163) (0.076)
Dummy monetary policy rate introduction 0.298 0.018 0.167 0.031
(0.232) (0.183) (0.181) (0.058)
Constant -0.120 -0.197 -0.180 -0.075
(0.198) (0.212) (0.118) (0.062)
Observations 54 41 57 61
R squared 0.398 0.341 0.255 0.682
Adjusted R squared 0.291 0.176 0.131 0.633
SE of regression 0.867 0.593 0.565 0.186
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with the Newey–
West estimator
***, **, * Next to a number indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Source:
Authors’ calculations
17 See Appendix I for the test results.
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The results of the M-TAR cointegration tests with the endogenously determined
threshold warrant the use of the asymmetric ECM. Table 4 reports the results of the
estimation of Eq. (9) for all series but the 6-month lending rate, for which the
hypothesis of symmetric cointegration cannot be rejected. Our attention falls on the
speed of adjustment above and below the threshold. If the retail rate is above its
equilibrium value after a decrease in the monetary policy rate, then the retail rate
will adjust by the coefficient of the speed of adjustment above s in every period.
Conversely, if the retail rate is below its equilibrium value after an increase in the
monetary policy rate, then the lending rate will adjust by the coefficient of the speed




























































































































































Asymmetric Pass-Through on Three-Month Rates
Fig. 1 Timing of one percentage point change in the monetary policy rate (percentage points). Notes:
Deviations above s correspond to monetary policy rate cuts, while deviations below s correspond to
monetary policy rate hikes. Source: Authors’ calculations
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We find evidence of significant asymmetric adjustment for the 3-month rates. In
particular, we employ a Wald test with a null hypothesis for which the speed of
adjustment above s is equal to the speed of adjustment below s. Our results suggest
that the speed of adjustment for the 3-month deposit rate is higher when the
monetary policy rate falls. Conversely, the speed of adjustment for the 3-month
lending rate is higher when monetary policy rate increases. More specifically, the
speed of adjustment for positive deviations is 1.5 times the one for negative
deviations in the case of deposit rates, suggesting that negative deviations are more
persistent, whereas the speed of adjustment for negative deviations is two times the
one for positive deviations in the case of lending rates, suggesting that positive
deviations are more persistent.
For rates at higher maturities the two speeds of adjustment coefficients are not
significantly different from each other. However, short maturities provide a better
measure as loans are typically not collateralized and this allows isolating the
balance sheet channel (Mishkin 1995). In other words, the pass-through does not
depend on market price variations that influence the value of collateral. This
reinforces the evidence of the results on 3-month rates.
4.3 Simulation
To evaluate the effect of an exogenous monetary policy shock, we conduct a
simulation exercise to generate time paths for retail rates. The policy experiment
consists of a policy tightening corresponding to an increase by one percentage point
in the monetary policy rate, starting from a situation in which the system is in
equilibrium and simulating the adjustment of the retail rates over the following year.
Figure 1 presents the symmetric adjustment path for all retail rates, as well as the
asymmetric adjustment path for the 3-month rates.18
While the symmetric adjustment dynamics for different maturities are slightly
different, they all imply changes in spreads between 0.0 and 0.2 percentage points
when the adjustment is completed. On impact, an increase in the monetary policy
rate generates a negative spread of about 0.1 percentage points only for the 3-month
rates. The spread, however, halves over time. As the simulated adjustment is
symmetric by construction, any monetary policy easing implies a reduction in
banks’ profitability by the same amount during the first month.
Personal consumption and commercial loans are the fastest in incorporating
monetary policy changes. However, given the lower pass-through for the former, the
adjustment completes earlier despite a lower speed of adjustment. Mortgage loans,
possibly because of the higher frequency at which they are taken, display a smaller
short-run effect from the monetary policy rate change, but their speed of
convergence to long-run equilibrium is similar to the one of commercial loans.
Finally, we present the asymmetric adjustment path for the 3-month rates. By
construction, the short- and long-run impact is the same regardless of whether the
18 The law of motion for the retail rates is defined as, rrt ¼ c1 þ q b1  c1ð Þ where c1 is the short-run
impact of the monetary policy rate from Eq. (3), q is the speed of adjustment from Eq. (3), and b1 is the
lont-run impact of the monetary policy from Eq. (3). In the case of the asymmetric adjustment, q is
alternatively q1 or q2 from Eq. (8).
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shock generates a deviation above or below the threshold. However, the different
speeds of adjustments imply that deviations above the threshold (i.e., monetary
policy rate cuts) are corrected in a much faster fashion than deviations below it (i.e.,
monetary policy rate hikes) for deposit rates, while the opposite is true for lending
rates.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the interest rate pass-through of monetary policy rates to
retail rates in the Dominican Republic. Based on a recent 10-year monthly sample
from 2006 to 2015, we estimate the interest rate pass-through for deposit and
lending rates at different maturities and for different loan category rates. Also, we
explore the costs associated with changes in the monetary policy stance by
estimating the interest rate pass-through to government bond rates. Finally, we
investigate if the speed of the monetary transmission mechanism is conditional on
whether the monetary policy becomes more contractionary or expansionary, and we
simulate its impact on the retail rates.
We find that while the pass-through to deposit and lending rates is complete,
confirming the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Government domestic bond rates also react to monetary policy changes. Moreover,
our results reveal that the pass-through to lending rates is generally faster than to
deposit rates. Finally, we find some evidence of asymmetric adjustment as short-
term deposit rates respond faster to monetary policy rate cuts than hikes, and short-
term lending rates respond faster to monetary policy rate hikes than cuts.
The theoretical literature explains asymmetric adjustment in the speed of
adjustment of retail rates with the collusive market hypothesis. In particular, the
bargaining power of banks could explain why the lending rates exhibit downward
rigidity to a monetary policy rate cut and upward flexibility to a monetary policy
rate hike. From a policy perspective, measures to reduce bank concentration and
boost competition in the financial system could be instrumental in enhancing the
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism by reducing asymmetries
in the adjustment of retail rates.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
Appendix I. Unit root and cointegration test results
See Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8.
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-1.490 -2.266 -2.399 -8.510*** -8.534*** -8.543***
Three-month
deposit rate
-1.285 -2.910* -2.999 -7.112*** -7.104*** -7.074***
Six-month deposit
rate
-1.203 -3.212** -3.328* -5.567*** -5.558*** -5.541***
One-year deposit
rate
-1.331 -3.114** -3.275* -6.546*** -6.540*** -6.526***
Weighted average
deposit rate
-1.355 -3.537** -3.696** -5.214*** -5.207*** -5.192***
Three-month
lending rate
-1.056 -2.516 -2.712 -11.970*** -11.938*** -11.907***
Six-month lending
rate
-1.079 -2.242 -2.466 -15.009*** -14.971*** -14.907***
One-year lending
rate
-1.119 -2.442 -2.579 -12.273*** -12.238*** -12.170***
Weighted average
lending rate
-0.990 -2.314 -2.494 -7.407*** -7.398*** -7.360***
Commercial
lending rate




-0.833 -2.468 -2.560 -7.804*** -7.792*** -7.746***
Mortgage lending
rate
















-1.416 -1.559 -2.024 -6.451*** -6.534*** -6.497***
The null hypothesis is that the series has a unit root. The lagged differences are included in the speci-
fications to obtain white noise residuals The Schwarz information criterion is used to select the optimal
lag length
***, **, * Next to a number indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively Source:
Authors’ calculations
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Table 6 Cointegration, Engle–
Granger test
The null hypothesis is that the
series do not have a
cointegration relationship. The
Schwarz information criterion is
used to select the optimal lag
length. The critical values are
from MacKinnon (1991)
***, **, * Next to a number
indicate statistical significance
at 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively. Source: Authors’
calculations
3-month deposit rate -5.489***
6-month deposit rate -5.531***
1-year deposit rate -4.928**
Weighted average deposit rate -6.185**
3-month lending rate -6.187***
6-month lending rate -8.774***
1-year lending rate -6.806***
Weighted average lending rate -6.741***
Commercial lending rate -6.373***
Personal consumption lending rate -6.158***
Mortgage lending rate -7.324***
5-year government domestic bond -3.640
7-year government domestic bond -3.224
10-year government domestic bond -3.094
10-year government external bond -3.040
Table 7 Cointegration, TAR and M-TAR tests with threshold set to zero
TAR M-TAR
U (q1 = q2 = 0) F (q1 = q2) U (M) (q1 =q2 = 0) F (M) (q1 = q2)
3-month deposit rate 14.588*** 0.032 14.648*** 0.124
6-month deposit rate 15.649*** 0.062 16.393*** 1.202
1-year deposit rate 3.406 0.111 3.606 0.480
Weighted average
deposit rate
18.225*** 0.617 18.723*** 1.355
3-month lending rate 5.116* 0.481 6.975** 3.823
6-month lending rate 8.884** 0.996 16.393*** 1.202
1-year lending rate 20.237*** 0.141 3.605 0.480
Weighted average
lending rate
17.890*** 0.015 18.055*** 0.260
Commercial lending rate 19.294*** 0.048 19.418*** 0.228
Personal consumption
lending rate
2.211 0.018 2.276 0.143
Mortgage lending rate 17.346*** 1.393* 18.007*** 2.392
The null hypothesis of the test statistic U is that the series do not have a cointegration relationship, and the
null hypothesis of the test statistic F is that the series have symmetric cointegration relationships. The
critical values are generated via Monte Carlo simulations. Source: Authors’ calculations
***, **, * Next to a number indicate statistical significance at 1, 5
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